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Abstract
Genetic testing is controversial in adoption with professionals taking different positions
on whether children should be protected from genetic information or whether it can
be used to assist adoption. In this article, we argue that advances in ‘genome-wide’
testing add further complications to these debates. Although next-generation sequenc-
ing (NGS) and microarray-based technologies can offer high-quality molecular diagnoses
for a variety of conditions, they also increase the burden of interpretation. For these
reasons, adoption professionals will need to understand the relevance and complexity
of biomedical information. Our study explores the accounts of social workers’ and med-
ical advisors’ knowledge and reasoning about genetic testing in adoption. Twenty par-
ticipants, including social workers, managers, medical advisors and paediatricians, were
recruited from adoption services in England and Wales. A key finding revealed that
medical professionals reported increasing pressure to test children prior to adoption,
whilst social workers justified testing on the basis that it reduced uncertainty and there-
fore assisted adoption. Professionals’ accounts of genetic testing suggest that social
workers may not be aware of the potential indeterminacy of microarray and NGS tech-
nologies. This has important implications for adoption because increases in genomic un-
certainty can stigmatise children and disadvantage their prospects for adoption.
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Introduction
Genetic testing is controversial in adoption. Professionals take different
positions on whether children should be protected from genetic informa-
tion or whether it can be used to assist adoption. These positions stem
from debates in the 1990s that now inform genetics policy in the UK.
The consensus view is that decisions regarding the genetic testing of
healthy children must respect the child’s autonomy. Despite these guide-
lines, anecdotal evidence suggests that medical professionals are fre-
quently pressurised by adoption teams and prospective adopters to carry
out testing to ‘guarantee’ the child’s future health. Often implied by
such requests is the removal of medical uncertainty from decision-
making around adoption.
The availability of ‘genome-wide’ testing adds further complications to
these debates. We argue that previous ethical thinking based on predic-
tive genetic testing assumes that a clear result would reduce uncertainty.
However, new forms of diagnostic testing are likely to produce informa-
tion that increases it. In this study, we explore the accounts of social
workers and medical advisors discussing cases of genetic testing and
their understanding of uncertainty in adoption. It is necessary to con-
sider several factors to understand the context in which genetic informa-
tion is used: we need to understand the changing profile of the adopted
child, the recent policy on avoiding delays in adoption and the increasing
acceptance of genetics as an explanatory ‘tool’ for health assessment.
Together, these factors have shaped a system that has become less toler-
ant of uncertainty, especially when efforts are concentrated on securing
permanence for looked after children.
Changing profile of adoption
The profile of the adopted child today is very different from the classic
model of adoption. Traditionally, adoption in the UK was a private pro-
cess involving healthy white babies relinquished by birth parents to cul-
turally similar adopters. Reflecting the values of the late Victorian era,
‘closed’ adoption served to reinforce the legitimacy of the marital family
unit (O’Halloran, 2015). After the legalisation of abortion in 1968, adop-
tions consistently declined, with far fewer babies available and with
adopted children more likely to be ethnically dissimilar from their
adopters. Open adoption practices emerged from increasing recognition
of the fluid and impermanent characteristics of modern families as well
as the right of adoptees to access information about their medical and
birth family history (Hill et al., 2010).
Today, UK adoption agencies work to secure permanence for children
who are the subject of care orders. Looking after children is
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substantially more likely to have Special Educational Needs (SEN) with
55.9 per cent requiring SEN support compared with 14.9 per cent of all
children in England (Department for Education [DfE], 2019). Many of
these children have complex physical and/or health-related problems
and developmental delay, with diverse causes including genetic factors
and foetal alcohol syndrome (DfE, 2015). Despite the diversity of con-
temporary adoptees, there is a persistent mismatch between the expecta-
tions of adopters and the characteristics of children available (Cousins,
2009). Adopters are less likely to consider children with learning disabil-
ities or behavioural disorders, especially those whose problems are likely
to have a genetic origin (Kingston, 2007).
In addition to meeting the challenges of placing children, adoption
specialists also face institutional pressures to speed up adoption pro-
cesses. Under Blair’s Labour government, the Adoption and Children
Act (2002) sought to overturn the culture of adoption from serving
middle-class interests in creating a system that supported the diverse
needs of children (Bunt, 2014). A key strategy was to widen the pool of
adopters to facilitate the placement of children with disabilities, many of
whom were in long-term looked after care. The rise of ‘permanency
planning’ (Fein and Maluccio, 1992) is another key policy that strives to
secure a sense of security, continuity and identity for looked after chil-
dren. Under this framework, local authorities may pursue adoption as
the best option for a looked after child (DfE, 2011). Agencies are there-
fore under considerable pressure to facilitate a good match for children
with diverse needs.
Health assessments and genetic testing
It is important that prospective adopters are fully informed about the
child’s early life experiences. Under the Adoption Act Regulations
(2005), agencies have a legal duty to obtain and communicate health in-
formation, including the child’s birth family history. However, back-
ground information is often incomplete or unreliable (Hill and Edwards,
2009). Furthermore, social workers may not be equipped to communi-
cate the technical aspects of disabilities or medical risks. Medical advi-
sors play a key role in providing health information to prospective
adopters. In conjunction with social workers, they conduct health assess-
ments and collate information which is crucial in informing the adoption
agency’s matching process (Sampeys and Barnes, 2017).
In recent decades, there has been increasing acceptance of genetics as
an explanatory tool in adoption. During health assessment, a medical ad-
visor may refer a child to clinical genetics for three main reasons: (i) the
child presents with features suggestive of an underlying genetic disorder;
(ii) the child is unaffected but family history raises concern about future
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risk and (iii) there is a history of substance misuse or infections during
pregnancy, most commonly associated with foetal alcohol exposure.
Clinical genetic assessment involves physical examination for features
suggestive of an underlying disorder, as well as gathering background in-
formation about the child’s medical and family history. However, with-
out the cooperation or consent of birth parents, genetic assessment will
be limited (Hill et al., 2010). Lingering diagnostic uncertainty may war-
rant further investigations, such as genetic testing, as part of working up
a thorough clinical assessment (Parker et al., 2016).
There are three broad categories of testing in medical genetics: diag-
nostic testing can target specific genes or scan the entire genome for var-
iations to aid clinical diagnosis. The most common instances of
diagnostic testing in adoption are cases of suspected developmental de-
lay or foetal alcohol syndrome. Predictive testing applies to inherited
conditions with an onset usually in adult life, as with Huntington’s dis-
ease, or later in childhood. Testing positive means the individual will de-
velop the disorder, though age of onset is variable. Carrier testing is
usually carried out on unaffected individuals at risk of transmitting re-
cessive or sex-linked conditions to their own future children, such as cys-
tic fibrosis or haemophilia (Turnpenny and Ellard, 2017).
In all these cases, a request to perform testing on a child requires con-
sent from a parent or an individual with parental responsibility.
However, if there is no immediate medical benefit to the child, then the
recommendation is that testing should be deferred until the child is able
to give consent. There are circumstances where genetic testing may be
requested to explain developmental problems, despite the indications be-
ing too weak to justify such testing in another child. The fact that a child
is looked after is sometimes used to lower the threshold for genetic
investigations (Newson and Leonard, 2010).
Ethics of genetic testing in adoption
Following the first wave of predictive tests developed in the 1980s and
1990s, policy debates considered whether genetic information was ‘ex-
ceptional’ and required its own special policies to protect individuals
from discrimination. Similar arguments have been made about genetic
testing of children. Predictive genetic testing for Huntington’s disease
became a model for recommending that children should not be tested
unless there is a clear medical benefit in doing so (World Federation of
Neurology, 1989; Bloch and Hayden, 1990). Testing a healthy child’s ge-
netic status at the request of others removes their right to decide for
themselves in adulthood (Harper and Clarke, 1990; Clarke, 1994).
In 1995, the American Society of Human Genetics (ASHG) and the
American College of Medical Genetics (ACMG) published a joint
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report, which set out the current policy regarding genetic testing in
adoption. They claimed that genetic information affected the ‘best inter-
est of the child’, which now included ‘the child’s physical and psycholog-
ical health, privacy interests and social development’ (1995, p. 761).
They reasoned that the standard for testing adopted children should be
equivalent to that of birth children and should not be used to ‘guaran-
tee’ the child’s health prior to adoption. They also warned that ‘exagger-
ated assessments of historical risk’ may stigmatise the child and
disadvantage their prospects for adoption (1995, p. 762).
Freundlich (1998) expressed similar concerns that adoption professio-
nals and prospective adopters were advocating the use of predictive ge-
netic testing for the purpose of ‘evaluating’ a child for adoption. Testing
children prior to adoption may not only be harmful—potentially altering
their status from adoptable to unadoptable—but implies a different stan-
dard of testing compared with children raised by biological parents. The
principle of equity maintains that restrictions on seeking predictive ge-
netic tests should apply equally to prospective adopters and biological
parents. However, Jansen and Ross (2001) developed an interesting ob-
jection to the equity principle. They argued that parenting through adop-
tion is not the same as parenting through birth. What they call the
‘matching argument’ holds that genetic information about children is rel-
evant insofar as it may be used by adoption agencies to find a suitable
family willing to adopt a child with a genetic disorder or, conversely, to
rule out families who feel unable to parent such a child. They claim that
restricting access to genetic testing may impede the state’s ability to find
suitable adopters for children.
Although policy statements in the USA and the UK are generally
consistent with respect to genetic testing of children, professional opin-
ion appears divided on the issue of adoption. The recommendation of
many professional groups in the USA is to restrict preadoption genetic
testing for adult-onset disease. Even the most recent position statement
of the ASHG, which acknowledges the matching argument, upholds its
previous recommendation ‘that children awaiting adoption and adopted
children be given the same consideration in genetic testing as children
living with their biological parents’ (2015, p. 14). Professional policy in
Europe remains in line with that of the ASHG. Recognising the impor-
tance of matching, the advice of the British Society for Human Genetics
reminds practitioners that discussion could still be helpful even without
testing, recommending that professionals have ‘an open discussion with
the prospective parents’ to place the risks for the child in context (2010,
p. 12).
Despite these restrictions, there are strong reasons why adoption
agencies and prospective adopters may pursue genetic testing. Court
decisions in the USA and UK have followed a pattern of imposing
higher standards of care on adoption agencies to provide complete
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medical information (McDonald-Nunemaker, 1994). In 2003, the High
Court for England and Wales judged that a local authority fell below
the reasonable standard of care when it failed to disclose information
about a child’s risk of behavioural difficulties to the adoptive parents
(Hill et al., 2010). With increasing pressure to disclose medical informa-
tion, adoption agencies may perceive genetic testing as a tool for risk
prediction. So too, prospective adopters may see genetic testing as an
opportunity to reduce uncertainties about a child’s future health
(Palmer, 2009). Whilst some argue for the expansion of preadoption ge-
netic testing on the basis that it better serves children with special needs
(Taylor, 2008; Taylor et al., 2010), others argue that this will only intro-
duce new uncertainties for adopters (Newson and Leonard, 2010;
Leighton, 2014; Parker et al., 2016; Newson et al., 2016). We examine
how the so-called matching argument in adoption copes with higher
rates of uncertainty in ‘genome-wide’ testing.
From genetic to genome-wide testing
Traditionally, genetic testing refers to relatively targeted investigations
involving single-gene mutations or structural chromosome rearrange-
ments, whereas ‘genome-wide’ testing can identify multiple variants in
the DNA sequence across the entire human genome. Recent advances
in genome-wide testing have increased the ability to detect genetic varia-
tion, thereby improving diagnosis for many conditions (Miller et al.,
2010). However, advances in detecting genetic variation are offset by the
burden of interpretation. Many novel findings may be poorly understood
and may not be causally related to the suspected condition. For these
reasons, genome-wide testing is likely to pose new challenges for
adoption.
The first line of investigation for a possible genetic cause of develop-
mental delay is microarray-based comparative genomic hybridisation.
But, in many cases, diagnostic testing may still fail to identify a genetic
cause thereby challenging the widely held assumption that genetic test-
ing is definitive and straightforward (Parker et al., 2016). In fact, the out-
comes of genome-wide testing can vary from those that are relevant to
an investigation (i.e. finding or not finding an abnormality for a clinical
problem), through those that may be relevant to future health (second-
ary and incidental findings) to those that are likely to sow confusion (i.e.
findings of uncertain significance).
Microarray testing has improved diagnostic yield by identifying dele-
tions and duplications of chromosomal material. Although some of these
variants are well characterised (e.g. 22q11.2 deletion syndrome), the clin-
ical significance of many other variants is not well understood. For in-
stance, a microdeletion within 15q11.2 is commonly associated with a








/bcab017/6148991 by guest on 24 February 2021
wide range of features including autistic traits and learning difficulties
(Burnside et al., 2011). However, variable expressivity and incomplete
penetrance in populations suggests that this microdeletion is probably a
risk factor rather than a causal explanation. This has raised concerns
amongst medical practitioners that its detection amongst looked after
children can be misleading and potentially stigmatising (Hamilton et al.,
2015).
With the mainstreaming of genomic medicine, adoption professionals
will need to understand the relevance and complexity of biomedical in-
formation (Arribas-Ayllon et al., 2020). Indeed, Jackson and Burke
(2019) found that medical advisors and social workers in Wales reported
many challenges concerning the appropriate use of genetic information
in adoption and expressed the need for more training and support.
However, these professionals believed that the impact of diagnosis on
adoption was minimal. Another study in the USA explored social work-
ers’ views of preadoption genetic testing (Erwin et al., 2018), many of
whom believed that testing was a useful ‘tool’ for adoption. But these
participants had limited experience of genetic testing and assumed a
model of predictive testing for single-gene conditions.
In the era of genomic medicine, some may believe that genetic testing
removes uncertainty about a child’s future health, whilst others may
need to surpass their negative associations of genetics to promote the
best interests of the child (Taylor, 2008, 2010). Unlike previous studies
that have invited social workers to speculate on their knowledge of ge-
netic testing, this study infers knowledge and understanding from
reported cases. We ask how do social workers and medical advisors ret-
rospectively account for cases involving preadoption genetic testing?
Method
This was a qualitative study funded by the Wellcome Trust (205644/Z/
16/Z) to conduct preliminary research on the impact of genome-wide
testing on adoption. Social workers were contacted through the National
Adoption Service, all of whom were self-selecting as having first-hand
experience of cases involving genetic testing. Medical advisors working
in each of the local authorities were contacted individually via e-mail.
Snowball sampling was used to contact participants who were singled
out as having relevant experience; this widened our recruitment to
England. Twenty participants were recruited through purposive sampling
of social workers (n¼ 8), social work managers (n¼ 4) and medical advi-
sors/community paediatricians (n¼ 8) working in adoption services in
Wales. Medical advisors were all mid-to-late career, social workers were
more diverse, ranging from the newly qualified to those with over thirty-
five years’ experience.
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Semi-structured qualitative interviews gathered detailed accounts of
retrospective cases involving genetic testing in adoption. Treating re-
search interviews as ‘accounts’ (Scott and Lyman, 1968) recognises that
participants in interviews perform actions as well as representing states
of affairs. Drawing on Austin’s (1961) classic formulation, there are two
varieties of accounts, justifications and excuses, which are central to the
management of responsibility. Accounts are therefore explanations or
defences for conduct which may be heard as reasons for action (Antaki,
1994). These activities are especially relevant to professionals who con-
struct reasoned accounts for genetic testing in adoption. Interviews ex-
plored a range of issues concerning: past cases of preadoption genetic
testing, circumstances that trigger a genetic investigation, procedures for
recording and communicating genetic information between professionals,
practices of sharing information with prospective adopters, the impact of
genetic information on post-placement experiences and whether a ge-
netic diagnosis disadvantages a child’s prospects for adoption. All the
interviews lasted between sixty and ninety minutes, were audio-recorded
and subsequently transcribed verbatim.
Transcripts were coded via an iterative process of reading and noticing
relevant phenomena, allowing the analyst (first author) to arrange data
according to differences, commonalities and structures. Coded selections
of data were compiled into a sub-corpus for group discussion (involving
all three authors). Data extracts were selected to identify patterns of ac-
counting and then arranged narratively around the central theme of ‘un-
certainty’, which most participants recognised as a major issue in
adoption. Each of the themes selected for analysis indicate how various
forms of case construction, ethical deliberation and personal reflection
are activities designed to justify professional conduct (see
Supplementary Material for a statement on methodological limitations
of the study). The study was approved by the School of Social Sciences
Research Ethics Committee of Cardiff University (SREC/2229).
Findings and analysis
A significant finding of the study was that participants discussed genetic
testing in relation to historically higher levels of uncertainty in adoption.
Social workers and medical advisors accounted for uncertainty in several
ways: as a physical or future characteristic of the child, a lack of infor-
mation about the child’s history, an unavoidable outcome of adoption
and even a psychological reason for testing. The following themes reflect
the range and variation of professional dilemmas including: Imposition
of testing and Juxtaposition of placement and the child’s autonomy. We
explain these themes and provide an analytic commentary on key
extracts.
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Imposition of testing
All the medical advisors we interviewed reported cases involving inap-
propriate requests for testing prior to adoption. Whilst ‘clinical indica-
tion’ was cited as the most valid reason for testing a child, it was
common to find this justification contrasted with the views of a ‘social
worker’. We begin with a medical advisor giving an account of circum-
stances that trigger a genetic investigation:
Typically the testing is arranged when we have concerns about the
child’s developmental progress, perhaps when a child presents with
learning difficulties, and also when children have other
neurodevelopmental conditions, perhaps diagnosis of autistic spectrum
disorder. All of these factors would then initiate a screen to see, well is
there a medical explanation? It would be based on those clinical
indications, rather than whether a social worker thinks it’s a good idea
to do a test. We do sometimes get pressured for that, in terms of when
we know maybe there’s a wider family member who has a genetic
change, sometimes the questions seem to be asked around, well, should
we be testing this child who has perhaps a more distant [affected]
relative, when they’re asymptomatic, maybe when they’re very young,
for the same genetic change? I think that’s one of the headaches that
array testing has thrown up.
In this account of ‘factors’ that typically warrant testing, clinical indi-
cation of neurodevelopmental problems is heard to be more legitimate
than the social worker’s reasons for testing. Dilemmas arise when testing
is requested for an ‘asymptomatic’ child because a ‘distant relative’ has
a known mutation. The increasing accessibility and sensitivity of micro-
array testing is likely to create more of these dilemmas (‘headaches’) for
medical professionals. Another medical advisor provided an even stron-
ger account of inappropriate testing involving an asymptomatic child.
R: What if there is a family history but no dysmorphic features? [. . .]
MA: Well I mean one of the ones I can think of is where there has been
a family history of [inherited neuropathy] where there has been huge
pressure from the [local] authority to undertake genetic testing and we
are, it’s felt, and in discussion with genetics, it’s not appropriate to do so
because the child [has] got no symptoms. There is nothing we are going
to do about it, we aren’t going to treat anything at this point in time,
and that the testing should be done at a later date if it is necessary. [. . .]
R: Right, so why is that [pressure to test] then?
MA: Because uncertainty makes children more difficult to place [. . .] I
think they like to know that children don’t have things so that they can
go forward with, this child has been tested and there is no evidence.
The medical advisor recalls a case of ‘huge pressure . . . to undertake
genetic testing’. An account of not testing is justified on moral (‘it’s
felt’) and clinical (‘no symptoms’) grounds with the support of clinical
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genetics. Asked to explain this tension, the medical advisor gives an em-
phatic reply: ‘Because uncertainty makes children more difficult to
place’. This implies that local authorities believe that diagnostic testing
will reduce uncertainty; it also suggests that prospective adopters are
risk averse and therefore unlikely to adopt a child with a family history
of genetic risk. This contradicts the findings of Jackson and Burke’s
(2019, p. 270) study, where professionals reported that prospective
parents ‘placed little importance on genetic testing’. Such views may in-
deed lead social workers to believe, like the participants in Erwin et al.’s
(2018) study, that genetic testing is a useful ‘tool’ in adoption. But this
assumes that a genetic test will show that ‘children don’t have things’
which overlooks the possibility that a child may indeed test positive.
When children ‘do have things’ like dysmorphic features and signs of
developmental delay, other actors also appear to have a stake in testing.
It is well known that Foetal Alcohol Spectrum Disorder (FASD) is over-
represented in the care system. Despite the guidance for clinical assess-
ment, diagnosis can be difficult to establish in an individual child
(Douzgou et al., 2012). The current guidance (SIGN, 2019) recommends
referral to a clinical geneticist if the features are atypical or prenatal ex-
posure to alcohol is uncertain, but such referrals have often been used
to exclude other causes. Below, a medical advisor describes a case in
which diagnostic testing was ‘requested’ by the courts to confirm a diag-
nosis of FASD:
R: Are there any situations where you think CGH just shouldn’t be
used?
MA: Foetal Alcohol Syndrome, I think if the case is strong history of
using alcohol heavily during pregnancy, if the child is showing from birth
some indication that he or she would be Foetal Alcohol Syndrome and
if it proves by dysmorphism and behaviour why should I do an array
CGH?
R: [. . .] Who demands it? Where is the pressure coming from to have
CGH in foetal alcohol?
MA: There is no pressure but it is mentioned in all the literature so it
can be requested but shouldn’t be requested.
R: So sometimes the courts make you do stuff that you think isn’t
medically- ?
MA: Ah, absolutely it happened to me. It did happen to me a child who
is typical, classical foetal alcohol syndrome in every aspect and I have
done my medical report and I said, this child is foetal alcohol syndrome
around everything. And later on the court, without consulting me, asked
for another community paediatrician who is interested in foetal alcohol
syndrome to come and see this child from somewhere in [North
England] and not even letting me know. And this person came and said,
yes this child is foetal alcohol syndrome [. . .] so the court requested for
me to do an array CGH.
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If the child meets the clinical criteria of FASD, the rhetorical question
‘why should I do an array CGH?’ seems to defy expectations that the
child should be tested. The medical advisor denies the suggestion of ex-
ternal ‘pressure’, explaining that the guidelines condone testing; instead,
her concern is oriented to unnecessary testing. A question about the in-
volvement of ‘the courts’ elicits a case where the courts had intervened
in the assessment of a child diagnosed with ‘classical’ FASD features.
The medical advisor complains that the courts had surreptitiously
approached ‘another . . . paediatrician’ who commissioned an array
CGH. This case highlights different thresholds for testing amongst pae-
diatricians as well as the motivations of the family courts to pursue test-
ing. Later in the interview, she explained that ‘the child was going for
adoption’ and the family courts wanted ‘proof’. In fact, several medical
advisors reported that ‘social workers’, ‘special guardians’ and ‘the
courts’ believed that a genetic test for FASD actually existed but, as one
medical advisor put it, ‘there is no clinical investigation that’s going to
give us that answer’.
Here, medical professionals are reporting the unwelcome ‘pressure’ to
test children prior to adoption. Professional groups and authorities are
misaligned in their roles and expectations of managing and reducing
risk, whilst medical professionals are positioned as defending guidelines
and their own clinical judgement.
Juxtaposition of placement and the child’s autonomy
When social workers and medical professionals gave reasoned accounts
of testing or not testing children, they did so by juxtaposing the practical
ethics of placement with the principle-based ethics of the child’s auton-
omy. This is characteristic of the debates in the literature where it is
claimed that rigorous adherence to the principle of autonomy can limit
the child’s prospects of adoption (see Taylor, 2008). Proponents of the
matching argument claim that the ‘exceptionalism’ of adoption is justifi-
cation for testing (Jansen and Ross, 2001). Our focus is to show how the
validity of these reasons rest on certain assumptions about genetic
testing.
The following account comes from an experienced social worker who
wanted to express her explicit disagreement with the guidelines. She
presents the case of a ‘young child’ for whom testing was declined be-
cause he was too young to give consent. She claims that this decision
made her role as ‘family finder’ difficult: ‘it ruled out 80% of the people
that I was looking at and we had great, great difficulty finding adopters
for him’. The issue, she explains, is the amount of uncertainty adopters
are willing to tolerate:
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Ultimately adoption is all about uncertainty and most adopters will go to
the middle range of uncertainty, perhaps unknown father, some medical
history in the family, perhaps some depression or personality disorder.
And here we have a lot of the- those parents affected by drugs and
alcohol. So that to me is a general scenario of our children’s
background. You throw in something like a major illness and
Huntington’s chorea is the other situation. That is too much, you know
they will say no no. We have a system of matching children, we have a
register- which is nationwide to try and link up families and children and
we would get no, no, no. Very occasionally we’ve had a yes and we have
placed a little boy with- I think it was neurofibromatosis with a family,
but they are really exceptional. So for me, it closes down the pool of
potential people and adoption I know is all about uncertainty and some
people don’t want to know. Adults don’t want to know whether they
have it or not. I suppose (laughs) I just think that it’s the right of the
child to have knowledge about what we can say about them because
there’s so much we can’t say. And lots of children don’t know who their
fathers are so 50% of their make-up, we haven’t got a clue. So I’m sort
of very for testing (laughs) [. . .] Just the exact opposite of what’s in your
guidelines, isn’t it?
We are told that ‘most adopters’ will accept an intermediate level of
risk but only the ‘exceptional’ family will accept a child with a genetic
disorder, an observation apparently confirmed by the adoption register.
Not testing children for known risks ‘closes down the pool of potential
people’, which implies that testing reduces uncertainty and therefore
improves the child’s prospects of placement.
When social workers were presented with the autonomy argument, no
one disputed its validity as a reason for not testing a child. But there
was a clear distinction between medical professionals emphasising the
child’s right to decide and social workers appealing to the responsibili-
ties of adults to decide. In the following account, the manager of an
adoption agency justifies adult decisions in terms of advocating the ‘best
interests’ of the child:
I: . . .we’re talking about how the prospective parents are going to deal
with this information, but there’s the whole ethical rights of the child.
They don’t have a choice in whether this test is done.
SW: Absolutely. [. . .] we’re always talking about the child being the
centre of the process, aren’t we? So are we making those decisions for
us as adults or for them as a child? You could argue that by knowing,
we are custodians of this child, we have to make the decisions they can’t
make at that time in their life. And we are able to justify that by having
that information means that we might be able to advocate for particular
treatment in the future. Or we might be able to get to a point where we
can explain the uncertainty in a manageable way to our child as they
grow up. But yeah, it always has to come back to the child, and what is
in their best interests. But you have got numerous professionals who are
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all very experienced and who are all very competent, and absolutely feel
in their head that they have the best interest of that child, but they’re
going to have conflicting agendas.
The manager is responding to the charge that the ‘whole ethical rights
of the child’ may be ignored in adult decisions to test. In explaining that
adoption services are entirely child-centred, she recasts the problem in
terms of who the test is for. An argument in favour of adults wanting to
know is justified in terms of custodial authority. Furthermore, having
‘that [genetic] information’ may have clinical utility ‘in the future’ where
adults can ‘explain the uncertainty’ to the child over time. But we must
assume that the manager is thinking of a case in which information may
impact on the child’s clinical management in the future. This contradicts
the medical advisor’s point above that testing should be deferred ‘if it’s
not going to alter the child’s medical management’ in the present. The
manager respectfully represents these differing professional views as
‘conflicting’ but valid interpretations of the best interests of the child.
Only one social worker in our study was able to explain the differen-
ces between predictive genetic testing and genome-wide testing. With
over 30 years’ experience, she articulated the ethical dilemmas of placing
a child with a family history of Huntington’s disease. Not testing the
child prior to adoption was justified on the grounds that it ‘takes away’
the child’s right to choose for themselves in the future. This was immedi-
ately contrasted by a case involving a child who was tested for a sus-
pected chromosome disorder. The following case illustrates how the
outcomes of microarray testing are anything but definitive and
straightforward:
I’ve had involvement with people whereby a child is deemed to have a
chromosome disorder and I’ve been with some of my adopters to see a
genetic counsellor. It’s very confusing for people, I think, because
they’re often told, we know there’s something different, but we don’t
know what the implications of that difference is. We will have to wait
and see if we’ve got another child with the same chromosome disorder
to find out what common difficulties might arise from that disorder. So
adoptive parents are always aware that there’s a huge degree of
uncertainty in terms of the background of their children, but the
increases of information [are] helpful, to a degree. But it also throws up
a lot of issues as well.
Even under the exemplary circumstances of accompanying adopters to
see a ‘genetic counsellor’, the experience is described as ‘very confusing
for people’. Adopting the voice of the counsellor, the social worker
explains how the detection of ‘something different’ is the basis of uncer-
tainty. She also gives an accurate account of how understanding chromo-
somal variants relies on observational studies of children who have ‘the
same chromosome disorder’. Clinical studies look for correlations be-
tween poorly understood variants and their manifestation in children
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over time. Whilst genome-wide testing may reflect ‘increases of informa-
tion’, they can also confirm the ‘huge degree of uncertainty’ that charac-
terises the child’s background.
So how did the counsellor’s account of uncertainty affect the adop-
tion? The social worker continues:
I think in [that] instance where we saw a genetic counsellor, because he
was able to say we don’t know what this abnormality is likely to give
rise to, then it did cause my adopters to have second thoughts and not
to proceed with the placement, which was sad. I felt bad for the child,
really, but then if they weren’t going to accept him come what may, then
perhaps they weren’t the right people for him anyhow. So it depends on
what the circumstances are, because I suppose some things can give you
a clearer answer than others because it’s such an unfolding field, really,
isn’t it?
When children present with problems, and adults exercise their rights
and responsibilities to know, the outcome of a genetic investigation does
not necessarily resolve uncertainty. In the case above, uncertainty has
simply acquired a new medical category. In line with the kind of risk
aversion that seems to characterise contemporary adoption, we are told
that the adopters had ‘second thoughts’ and the placement did not pro-
ceed. Perhaps, the most striking feature of the social worker’s account is
her sympathy for the child who had not only lost a potential family but
had now acquired the stigma of genomic uncertainty. It was common for
social workers in our interviews to justify the breakdown of placement
in terms of the character of adopters—that in the face of genetic risk
perhaps they were not the ‘right people’ for the child after all.
In this theme, we hear the contrasting moral justifications of professio-
nals arguing for and against testing. Social workers acknowledge the
child’s autonomy but argue that the consensus position is too restric-
tive—adults have a responsibility as custodians to remove uncertainty as
an impediment to adoption. Medical professionals seek to limit the right
of adults by foregrounding the uncertainty of testing as well as the rights
of children to choose for themselves in the future.
Conclusion
With the mainstreaming of genomic medicine, genome-wide testing is
likely to become a common line of investigation for diagnosing a whole
variety of children presenting with neurodevelopmental problems. For
these reasons, ethical debates over whether to test a child prior to adop-
tion are likely to become more relevant to different professional groups,
each of whom are charged with promoting the ‘best interests’ of the
child.
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Unlike previous studies that measure social workers’ hypothetical
knowledge of preadoption genetic testing (Taylor et al., 2010; Erwin
et al., 2018), this study explored actual cases accounted for by social
workers and medical advisors. We have shown that conflict between pro-
fessional groups occurred when two kinds of ‘exceptionalism’ were
claimed. On the one side, medical professionals claimed that genetic in-
formation was exceptional because it contains unique data about individ-
uals. Arguments in favour of autonomy claimed that genetic information
belongs exclusively to individuals, and that their right to decide how and
when this is used ought to be protected. On the other side, social work-
ers claimed that adoption itself was exceptional and that access to ge-
netic information may improve the child’s prospects for adoption. The
so-called matching argument holds that the ‘right to know’ is a legiti-
mate custodial responsibility of adults to place the child in a suitable
home. We believe that both arguments are valid. Given that looked-
after children are a complex paediatric population, it makes no sense to
treat children eligible for adoption as the same in principle as those who
are raised by their biological parents. In our study, social workers and
medical professionals were united in recognising that adopted children
encompass higher levels of uncertainty.
Our concern is not whether the ‘right to know’ in social care is unrea-
sonable but whether the matching argument is realistic about what con-
stitutes ‘genetic testing’. Like so many arguments that have informed
genetics policy, those in favour of testing children are derived from sce-
narios involving predictive genetic testing for Huntington’s Disease, where
outcomes are, for the most part, definite and clear. But genome-wide
testing is not definite and clear—it can produce outcomes about small
variations in chromosomal material of which very little are currently
known. This has important implications for adoption because many so-
cial workers may be unaware of the potential indeterminacy of genome-
wide testing. Indeed, if prospective adopters are as risk averse as we are
led to believe, then receiving an unclear result (where the future impli-
cations of a child’s health and development are unknown) may give
adopters further reason to withdraw from adoption. Also, if there is a
prevailing assumption in social care that genetic testing is a tool to
‘guarantee’ a child’s future health, then it is incumbent upon social sci-
entists to challenge this view. Uncertainty is likely to be an inherent as-
pect of the genomic investigation of children, which will require new
ways of tolerating and communicating uncertainty (Newson et al., 2016).
There is also a need to clarify exactly what role genetic testing plays
in statutory health assessments for adoption. Interviews with medical
professionals and social workers revealed contrasting views with respect
to their role in diagnosis and clinical judgement. For medical professio-
nals, a genetic investigation was not a proxy for clinical examination—
genetic testing played a contributory role in clinical judgement, which
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may not by itself explain a child’s condition. However, some outside the
medical profession may perceive testing as playing a decisive role in as-
sessment, capable of superseding the clinical judgement of the medical
practitioner. A case in point is the increasing pressure to use diagnostic
testing for children with suspected FASD which, in a previous paper, we
have shown can be mistakenly perceived as a test for FASD (Arribas-
Ayllon et al., 2020).
By drawing out these tensions amongst professionals, our aim is not to
imply a deficit of understanding amongst social workers but to show that
asymmetries of knowledge are a feature of different institutional values
and competing priorities. Where genetic testing becomes entangled in
the institutional politics of risk management, we find a strong desire to
remove uncertainty from adoption. The hope that testing can be used to
place children with parents who will be able to meet their needs is not
an unreasonable goal but, as we have seen, even our most ‘advanced’
technologies are incapable of removing doubt from adoption. We be-
lieve that education should proceed through greater opportunities of
knowledge-sharing amongst experienced social workers and through in-
terdisciplinary cooperation with medical professionals. Education is nec-
essary to provide competent counselling for prospective adopters to
accept and tolerate uncertainty and to reduce pressure on local authori-
ties to pursue genetic testing prior to adoption.
Funding
This work was supported by the Wellcome Trust, grant number 205644/
Z/16/Z.
Supplementary material
Supplementary material is available at British Journal of Social Work
Journal online.
References
Adoption and Children Act. (2002) ‘The national archives’, Retrieved from http://
www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2002/38/section/120.
Adoption Act Regulations. (2005) ‘The national archives’, Retrieved from https://
www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2005/389/contents/made.
American Society of Human Genetics and American College of Medical Genetics
(2000) ‘Genetic testing in adoption’, American Journal of Human Genetics, 66(3),
pp. 761–7.








/bcab017/6148991 by guest on 24 February 2021
Antaki, C. (1994) Explaining and Arguing: The Social Organization of Accounts,
London, Sage.
Arribas-Ayllon, M., Clarke, A. and Shelton, K. (2020) ‘Professionals’ accounts of ge-
netic testing in adoption: A qualitative study’, Archives of Disease in Childhood,
105(1), pp. 74–9.
ASHG (2015) ‘Points to consider: Ethical, legal, and psychosocial implications of ge-
netic testing in children and adolescents’, American Journal of Human Genetics,
97, 6–21.
ASHG/ACMG (1995) ‘Points to consider: ethical, legal, and psychosocial implications
of genetic testing in children and adolescents. American society of human genetics
board of directors, American college of medical genetics board of directors’,
American Journal of Human Genetics, 57(5), pp. 1233–41.
Austin, J. L. (1961) ‘A please for excuses’, in Urmson, J. D. and Warnock, G. (eds),
Philosophical Papers, Oxford, Oxford University Press.
Bloch, M. and Hayden, M. R. (1990) ‘Opinion. Predictive testing for Huntington’s
disease in childhood: challenges and implications’, American Journal of Human
Genetics, 46, 1–4.
British Society for Human Genetics (2010) Report on the Genetic Testing of Children
2010, Birmingham.
Bunt, S. (2014) ‘A framework for the analysis of the social processes in the adoption
of disabled children’, Journal of Social Work, 14(5), pp. 524–41.
Burnside, R. D., Pasion, R., Mikhail, F. M., Carroll, A. J., Robin, N. H., Youngs, E.
L., Gadi, I. K., Keitges, E., Jaswaney, V. L., Papenhausen, P. R., Potluri, V. R.,
Risheg, H., Rush, B., Smith, J. L., Schwartz, S., Tepperberg, J. H. and Butler, M.
G. (2011) ‘Microdeletion/microduplication of proximal 15q11.2 between BP1 and
BP2: A susceptibility region for neurological dysfunction including developmental
and language delay’, Human Genetics, 130(4), pp. 517–28.
Clarke, A. (1994) ‘The genetic testing of children. Working Party of the Clinical
Genetics Society (UK)’, Journal of Medical Genetics, 31(10), pp. 785–97.
Cousins, J. (2009) ‘Placing disabled children with permanent new families’, in
Schofield, G. and Simmonds, J. (eds), The Child Placement Handbook, London,
BAAF, pp. 345–63.
Department for Education (2011) An Action Plan for Adoption: Tackling Delay,
England.
Department for Education (2015) Promoting the Health and Well-Being of
Looked-after Children, England.
Department for Education (2019) Outcomes for Children Looked after by Local
Authorities in England, England.
Douzgou, S., Breen, C., Crow, Y. J., Chandler, K., Metcalfe, K., Jones, E., Kerr, B.
and Clayton-Smith, J. (2012) ‘Diagnosing fetal alcohol syndrome: New insights
from newer genetic technologies’, Archives of Disease in Childhood, 97(9), pp.
812–7.
Erwin, D. J., Uhlmann, W., Freeark, K. and Yashar, B. M. (2018) ‘Preadoption ge-
netic testing: Social Workers’ decision-making process’, Adoption Quarterly, 21(3),
pp. 141–60.
Fein, E. and Maluccio, A. N. (1992) ‘Permanency planning. Another remedy in jeop-
ardy’, Social Service Review, 66(3), pp. 335–48.
Freundlich, M. D. (1998) ‘The case against pre-adoption genetic testing’, Child
Welfare, 77, 663–79.








/bcab017/6148991 by guest on 24 February 2021
Hamilton, M. J., Tolmie, J. L., Joss, S., Morrison, N. and Suhaimi, N. M. (2015)
‘Chromosomal microarray analysis for looked after children: A double-edged
sword?’, Archives of Disease in Childhood, 100(2), pp. 206–7.
Harper, P. S. and Clarke, A. (1990) ‘Should we test children for "adult" genetic dis-
eases?’, The Lancet, 335(8699), pp. 1205–6.
Hill, C. and Edwards, M. (2009) ‘Birth family health history Adopters’ perspectives
on learning about their child’s health inheritance’, Adoption & Fostering, 33(2),
pp. 45–53.
Hill, C. M., Wheeler, R., Merredew, F. and Lucassen, A. (2010) ‘Family history and
adoption in the UK: conflicts of interest in medical disclosure’, Archives of
Disease in Childhood, 95(1), pp. 7–11.
Jackson, N. and Burke, K. (2019) ‘Attitudes to and experiences of genetic informa-
tion and testing among professionals working in the context of adoption’,
Adoption & Fostering, 43(3), pp. 256–73.
Jansen, L. A. and Ross, L. F. (2001) ‘The ethics of preadoption genetic testing’,
American Journal of Human Genetics, 104, 214–20.
Kingston, A. (2007) Mothering Special Needs: A Different Maternal Journey, London,
Jessica Kinsley Publishers.
Leighton, K. J. (2014) ‘Accepting adoption’s uncertainty: The limited ethics of
pre-adoption genetic testing’, Journal of Bioethical Inquiry, 11(2), pp. 245–60.
McDonald-Nunemaker, P. (1994) ‘Wrongful adoption: The development of a better
remedy in tort’, American Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers, 12, 391–414.
Miller, D. T., Adam, M. P., Aradhya, S., Biesecker, L. G., Brothman, A. R., Carter,
N. P., Church, D. M., Crolla, J. A., Eichler, E. E., Epstein, C. J., Faucett, W. A.,
Feuk, L., Friedman, J. M., Hamosh, A., Jackson, L., Kaminsky, E. B., Kok, K.,
Krantz, I. D., Kuhn, R. M., Lee, C., Ostell, J. M., Rosenberg, C., Scherer, S. W.,
Spinner, N. B., Stavropoulos, D. J., Tepperberg, J. H., Thorland, E. C.,
Vermeesch, J. R., Waggoner, D. J., Watson, M. S., Martin, C. L. and Ledbetter,
D. H. (2010) ‘Consensus statement: chromosomal microarray is a first-tier clinical
diagnostic test for individuals with developmental disabilities or congenital anoma-
lies’, The American Journal of Human Genetics, 86(5), pp. 749–64.
Newson, A. J. and Leonard, S. J. (2010) ‘Childhood genetic testing for familial can-
cer: Should adoption make a difference’, Familial Cancer, 9(1), pp. 37–42.
Newson, A. J., Leonard, S. J., Hall, A. and Gaff, C. L. (2016) ‘Known unknowns:
Building an ethics of uncertainty into genomic medicine’, BMC Medical
Genomics, 9(1), pp. 1–8.
O’Halloran, K. (2015) The Politics of Adoption: International Perspectives on Law,
Policy and Practice, Dordrecht, Springer.
Palmer, I. (2009) What to Expect When You’re Adopting, London, Vermilion.
Parker, M. J., Teasdale, K. and Parker, M. J. (2016) ‘The genetic assessment of
looked-after children: Common reasons for referral and recent advances’, Archives
of Disease in Childhood, 101(6), pp. 581–4.
Sampeys, C. and Barnes, P. (2017) ‘Health assessment of children being adopted:
Practice, challenges and dilemmas’, in eLS, Chichester, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd,
pp. 1–5.
Scottish Intercollegiate Guidelines Network (2019) Children and Young People
Exposed Prenatally to Alcohol. A National Clinical Guideline, Edinburgh (SIGN
publication no. 156).








/bcab017/6148991 by guest on 24 February 2021
Scott, M. B. and Lyman, S. M. (1968) ‘Accounts’, American Sociological Review,
33(1), pp. 46–62.
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